SOURc.cs.-The average tariff's the tariffs were obtained from tariff tables for the EEC, United States, and Japan. The export-tax information was obtained from a U.S. government interagency report on export restrictions (U.S. Government 1976). Export taxes and tariffs were averaged across countries using weights based on 1973 trade flows.
these tariffs on processed goods is often proposed as a way to improve the economic lot of the LDCs, but little has been done to implement such proposals. When industrial country policymakers have to choose between expanding processing in LDCs and not reducing it in their own countries, they usually side with their own processors.
Less often noted is the extensive use of export taxes by developing countries for the same purpose. The first column of table 1 shows that LDC export taxes are higher if products are exported in the primary rather than the processed form and hence tend to protect the processing activity in the country which produces the primary product.
Thus export-tax and import-tariff escalation tend to offset one another as far as the division of the processing pie is concerned. But both cause the price of the processed good to increase in the importing country, which reduces the size of that pie. It should then be possible to simultaneously reduce LDC export taxes on primary goods and DC import tariffs on processed goods in such a way that processing will expand in the LDCs but not contract in the DCs-that is, to
give DC policymakers an easier choice than is provided by suggestions that they unilaterally reduce their import duties.
II. Purpose of the Paper
In this paper we will estimate and compare the magnitudes and effects of LDC export taxes with those of DC import tariffs. Of particular interest are the effects on the amounts of processing performed in LDCs and DCs and on the levels of trade of primary and processed commodities.
In order to estimate such effects, it was necessary to construct a model capable of isolating them. While tariff escalation is usually studied by calculating effective rates of protection, the effective-rate concept breaks down when the small-country assumption is dropped.
In the context of north-south trade in commodities such as cotton and coffee, it is clearly not tenable to assume that either side is too small to influence world prices. Thus the model we developed is capable of determining resource flows and trade patterns without assuming that either the DCs or the LDCs take world prices as given.
The point of this analysis is to suggest the possibility of the simultaneous reduction of LDC export taxes on primary commodities and DC import tariffs on processed commodities. Unfortunately, sympathy for improving the economic lot of the poorer countries has become almost synonymous with voicing demands for unilateral concessions by the developed world. But while this "confrontation" has produced an acrimonious north-south dialogue, few substantive changes in economic policy have resulted. If areas of common interest between LDCs and DCs can be found, and if their benefits can be shown to be large relative to the LDC gains from unilateral gifts, perhaps the north-south dialogue can be diverted toward a more constructive path. Reductions of DC tariffs and LDC export taxes on raw and processed commodities is one such avenue of mutual interest.
III. The Model
The analysis is intended to capture the effects of the export taxes and import tariffs on the levels of production and of processing in LDCs and in DCs and the effects on exports of primary and processed goods from the LDCs. The model we have constructed is similar to the fixed coefficient, partial-equilibrium model used by Finger (1976b) to analyze the offshore assembly provisions in the U.S. tariff.
It is based on six behavioral relationships: demands in the DC and the LDC for the "finished" or "processed" good,1 and supplies in the DC ' "Finished" is, of course, relative to the process being studied. Whether the processed good is demanded by final consumers or by manufacturers who use it as an input is irrelevant for our purposes. and in the LDC of the primary good and of processing. The "quantity of processing" is defined conceptually as the quantity of primary goods processed, and the supply of processing relates this quantity to the unit rate of return to the processing activity-to the difference between the price paid for a unit of the primary good and the price received for that unit when it is sold in processed form.
Notation
As usual, P's are prices and Q's are quantities; T is one plus the ad valorem tariff rate in the importing (developed) country and X is one plus the ad valorem export tax rate in the exporting (developing) country; D's represent demand and S's supply, while ?'s are supply elasticities and F's are demand elasticities (defined so as to be negative for downward-sloping demand curves). Subscripts n (for north) and s (south) distinguish between the DC importer and the LDC exporter while b, c, and g distinguish among the primary good (e.g., beans), the processed good (e.g., coffee), and the processing activity (e.g., grinding).
The DC and LDC shares of consumption of the processed good are The production function for the processed good is assumed to be subject to fixed coefficients with the units defined in such a way that to produce one unit of the processed good requires one unit of the primary good and one unit of processing. The function may thus be written Qc=min (Qb,Qg) . (1) The same production function is assumed to apply in the DC and in the LDC. (6) defines Q as world quantity demanded of the processed good and equations (7) and (8) express the equilibrium conditions: Q = Dnc + Dsc (6) Q = Snb + Ssb (7) Q =Sng +Ssg (8) The complete model consists of the equilibrium conditions (7) and (8), the definitions (4), (5), (6), the price equations (2) and (3) When we substitute the demand and supply functions into (6), (7), and (8), and then use equations (2), (3), (4), and (5) to eliminate Pnb, Png, and Pnc, we can express the model as
Conceptually, these three equations can be solved for equilibrium value of Q, Psb, and Psc. Substitution into (2), (3), (4), and (5) In addition, we evaluate the expressions at the free trade equilibrium, that is, at the point at which Tc = Xc = Tb = Xb = 0. At this point A, the reciprocal of the value-added coefficient, is the same when measured in the exporting country (LDC) or in the importing country, that is, A=As=An. (18) After totally differentiating, taking proportional changes, and substituting from (12) We assume that supply curves slope upward (all F's positive) and demand curves slope downward (F's negative). (Note that den therefore is negative.) Downward-sloping demand curves imply that the sign of the effects on quantity consumed in the DCs and the LDCs will be the opposite of the sign of the effects on Pnc and Psc, respectively.
Also, upward-sloping supply curves imply that the sign of the effects on output of the primary good or on the level of processing in each country will be the same as the sign of the effect on the appropriate price.
Prices and Quantities
As intuition suggests, export taxes and tariffs on the processed good (Zc) raise its price in the importing and lower its price in the exporting countries. Similarly, the export taxes and tariffs on the primary good (Zb) raise its price in the importing DCs and lower its price in the exporting LDCs. Also, taxes on international sales of the processed good protect processing in importing countries and retard it in exporting countries, while trade taxes on the primary good have the opposite effect.
The cross-effects and the effects on total consumption do not fall into place so readily. Intuitively, one would reason that a tax on international trade in the finished good would reduce its consumption. This would reduce (derived) demand for the primary good, forcing down its price, both in the LDCs and the DCs.2 Likewise, we would expect a trade tax on the primary good to raise the overall cost and hence reduce consumption of the finished good. With less consumption of the finished good, demand for and hence the rate of return to processing are depressed.
While a priori knowledge suggests that these intuitive notions will probably be correct, it does not exclude the possibility of paradoxical results. Upon closer examination of equations (24), (26), and (28), we note that each of aQ/OZc, aPsb/OZc, and aPnb/9Zc will be negative, when cDsgRsgAfnRnc I > I FngRngAFsRsc , (31) zero when the two terms are equal, and positive when the inequality is reversed. Thus the cross-effects will be paradoxical (aPsb/OZc and OPnbl/Zc positive) only when the consumption effect is paradoxical (aQQaZc is positive).
While the signs of the elasticities do not assure that inequality (31) will hold, there is reason to presume that it will. As the DCs are importers of the processed good, not all of DC consumption is processed in the DCs, that is, Sng/Dn < 1. In the exporting LDCs, all of local consumption plus some goods for export are processed at home, that is, SsglDsc > 1. From this we have DnclSng > DsclSsg or Dnc/QSsgIQ > DscIQ * Sng/Q, which means that Rnc * Rsg > Rsc -Rng.
Thus, unless there is some basis for arguing that the elasticity of demand for the finished good is higher and/or the elasticity of supply of the processing activity is lower in LDCs than in DCs, the presumption would be that trade taxes on the finished good reduce total consumption and depress the price and output of the primary good in both the exporting and the importing country.
Similarly, the effect of primary-good trade taxes on total consumption "should" be negative and on the price of the finished good "should" be positive. Equations (24), (25), and (27) indicate that this will be the case if (NsbRsbu>ngRng (A -1) > qFnbRnb(FsgRsg (A -1 ). (32) That LDCs export the primary good implies Rng * Rsb > Rsg * Rnb, hence, inequality (32) will hold unless the elasticity of supply of the primary good is considerably lower and/or the elasticity of supply of processing considerably higher in LDCs than in DCs.
Value of LDC Exports
Equation (12), which specifies the value of LDC export receipts, can be rewritten as W= (Ssb-Ssg)PsbXb + (Ssg-Dsc)PscXc. (33) The intention of an LDC export tax on a primary good is to increase earnings from raw materials exports by exploiting monopsony power in the market for the primary good and/or to earn more on processed exports by shifting foreign demand to processed forms of the good. While the results reported in table 2 indicate that PsbXb will rise when Xb is imposed, the quantity exported will decline, especially if (Inb is large. Looking at the second term of the right side of equation (33), we note that while Xb will cause Ssg to increase, it could cause Psc to fall and Dsc to rise, and hence could reduce the value of exports of the finished good. Thus, while an export tax on the primary good will likely increase LDC export receipts, the per- calculations were similar to equations (24)- (30) but did not reflect the simplifying assumption that T's and X's were initially zero.
Results
Several experiments were performed: the DC import taxes were removed while holding the LDC export taxes constant, the export taxes were removed while holding the import taxes constant, and both trade taxes were eliminated simultaneously. The effects on production, consumption, and trade are presented in tables 3, 4, and 5. The sensitivity analysis reported in the Appendix shows that the results are quite robust with respect to variations in supply and demand elasticities.
The DC Tariffs
The DC tariffs are intended to protect DC processors, and removal of these tariffs would increase processing in the LDCs and reduce it in the DCs (table 3) . Liberalization entails increased final consumption in the north, lower consumption in the south, but increased consumption overall and hence increased raw material production for both "countries." The "shifting" of processing from DCs to LDCs is much more pronounced than is the "market-expansion" effect. The LDC export earnings would increase especially sharply on cotton, wool, and leather, and over the eight commodities would increase by about 16 percent.
The LDC Export Taxes
Repeal of the LDC export taxes alone would retard LDC processing of each of the commodities except leather, in which case the exporttax escalation is not steep enough to protect leather tanning4 (table 4) .
Elimination of export taxes has the expected result of increasing LDC raw-material production and lowering DC raw-material production. For some commodities, liberalization causes world final consumption to decline (cotton, wool, and wood).5 In most cases, LDC foreign exchange receipts fall after export-tax elimination.
Export and Import Taxes
Estimates presented in table 5 indicate that if LDC export and DC import taxes were simultaneously eliminated LDC processing of six of 4The export-tax escalation required to protect LDC value added depends on the input coefficient of the raw material in the finished good.
5The theoretical possibility of such counterintuitive results was discussed in Sec. Ill. Liberalization of export taxes and tariffs also stimulates rawmaterial production in the LDCs and retards it in the DCs.6 As is the case for processing, the LDC gain exceeds the DC loss. The DCs do not produce four of the eight raw materials.
The 8 percent increase in the level of processing in the LDCs amounts, at 1973 prices and based on 1973 levels of activity, to about $1.2 billion. On the same basis, the 4 percent increase of production in the LDCs of these primary products comes to about $0.9 billion.
Because "world" production and processing of commodities rise, the corresponding declines in the DCs are about one-third as large as the volume increases in the LDCs.
The effect of liberalization on LDC export earnings is not positive for all commodities, but overall the estimated increase is in excess of $1 billion. As policy alternatives to increase LDC export earnings go, this is a significant impact. Tariff preferences, by comparison, are estimated to have increased LDC exports (including trade diverted from DCs) by less than $500 million-and even under the most optimistic scenario of a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
without value limits and with expanded product, coverage would expand LDC export earnings (again including exports diverted from DCs) by only $772 million (Baldwin and Murray 1977, p. 37) .
The large increase in trade which would result from the liberaliza-6 Thus, the net effect of the LDC export and DC import taxes combined is to prot processing and primary production in the DCs. onstrate that LDCs have benefited from trade liberalization aimed primarily at interdeveloped country trade (Finger 1974 (Finger , 1976a . A conscious effort to locate and implement policies of mutual benefit to DCs and LDCs could make a far more important contribution to LDC development than futile demands for unilateral concessions. Substantive LDC involvement in multilateral negotiations can play a part in creating a more stable and less asymmetrical international economic order.
Appendix Sensitivity Analysis of Elasticity Values
The parameter values on which the results in the text are based are those which we feel are the "central tendencies" of available estimates. Our primary source of information on the parameter values was the opinion of World Bank commodities experts and U.S. Treasury commodity desk officers. Several estimates of elasticities of primary product supply and of demand for the processed good are available, but we found no direct estimates of the elasticity of the supply of processing. Hence values for this parameter are more a matter of expert opinion.
Table Al presents the effects of varying the supply and demand elasticities on the main conclusions of the paper. The rows of table Al correspond to the last row of table 5, that is, they reveal the effects of removing both LDC export taxes and DC tariffs on all eight commodities. Five variations from the base case are reported. (1) The LDC processing supply elasticity is lowered from 10 to 1 (i.e., set equal to the DC processing supply elasticity), (2) the demand elasticities are halved, (3) the demand elasticities are doubled, (4) the common primary supply elasticity is lowered from 0.5 to 0.3, (5) the primary supply elasticity is raised to 0.8.
The results indicate that the main conclusions of the paper are quite robust. In all cases, simultaneous elimination of trade taxes increases the percentage rate of growth of LDC processing while causing a much smaller percentage decline in DC processing.
Halving the demand elasticities reduces the trade gains considerably, to $723 million, but even this figure exceeds, by over $200 million, Baldwin's and Murray's estimate of the trade expansion of GSP. The other results are also intact. In each case, world final consumption increases, LDC consumption decreases, DC consumption increases, LDC primary production increases, and DC primary production decreases as a result of liberalization.
